Cooperation and social control:effects of preferences, institutions, and social structure by Bakker, Dieko Marnix
  
 University of Groningen




IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2019
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Bakker, D. M. (2019). Cooperation and social control: effects of preferences, institutions, and social
structure. [Groningen]: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.98552819
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 13-11-2019



























Abbink, K., Brandts, J.,Herrmann, B.,&Orzen,H. (2010). Intergroup Conflict and IntraͲGroup
PunishmentinanExperimentalContestGame.ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐZĞǀŝĞǁ,ϭϬϬ(1),420–447.
doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.420
Adler, P., & Adler, P. A. (1987). Role conflict and identity salience: College athletics and the
academic role. dŚĞ ^ŽĐŝĂů ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ :ŽƵƌŶĂů, Ϯϰ(4), 443–455. doi:10.1016/0362Ͳ
3319(87)90059Ͳ0
Andreoni,J.(1995).WarmͲGlowversusColdͲPrickle:TheEffectsofPositiveandNegativeFraming







Ashforth, B. E., &Mael, F. (1989). Social Identity Theory and the Organization. ĐĂĚĞŵǇ ŽĨ
DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚZĞǀŝĞǁ,ϭϰ(1),20–39.doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4278999
Au,W.T.,&Kwong,J.Y.Y.(2004).MeasurementsandeffectsofsocialͲvalueorientationinsocial
dilemmas. InR.Suleiman,D.VBudescu, I.Fischer,&D.M.Messick (Eds.),ŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ
ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŽŶ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĚŝůĞŵŵĂƐ (pp. 71–98). Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
Press.
Axelrod,R.(1984).dŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ.NewYork:BasicBooks.














Balliet, D., Parks, C.,& Joireman, J. (2009). Social value orientation and cooperation in social
dilemmas: A metaͲanalysis. 'ƌŽƵƉ WƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ Θ /ŶƚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉ ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ, ϭϮ(4), 533–547.
doi:10.1177/1368430209105040







Bendor, J.,&Mookherjee,D. (1987). InstitutionalStructureand theLogicofOngoingCollective
Action.dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶWŽůŝƚŝĐĂů^ĐŝĞŶĐĞZĞǀŝĞǁ,ϴϭ(1),129.doi:10.2307/1960782
Bendor, J.,&Swistak,P. (2001).Theevolutionofnorms.ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ :ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ,ϭϬϲ(6),
1493–1545.doi:10.1086/321298
Bertolotti,F.,Mattarelli,E.,Vignoli,M.,&Macrì,D.M.(2015).Exploringtherelationshipbetween







Bogaert,S.,Boone,C.,&Declerck,C. (2008).Socialvalueorientationandcooperation in social
dilemmas:a reviewandconceptualmodel.dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ ^ŽĐŝĂů WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ,ϰϳ(3),
453–480.doi:10.1348/014466607X244970




















Charness,G.,& Yang,C.ͲL. (2014). Starting small toward voluntary formationofefficient large



















online, and field experiments. :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ ĞŚĂǀŝŽƌĂů ĂŶĚ ǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů &ŝŶĂŶĐĞ, ϵ, 88–97.
doi:10.1016/j.jbef.2015.12.001
Cialdini,R.B.,Reno,R.R.,&Kallgren,C.A.(1990).Afocustheoryofnormativeconduct:Recycling
theconceptofnorms toreduce littering inpublicplaces. :ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂů
WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ,ϱϴ(6),1015–1026.doi:10.1037/0022Ͳ3514.58.6.1015
Cinyabuguma,M.,Page,T.,&Putterman,L.(2005).Cooperationunderthethreatofexpulsionina











DeCremer,D.,&Van Lange,P.A.M. (2001).Whyprosocialsexhibitgreater cooperation than






Diekmann, A., Jann, B., Przepiorka, W., & Wehrli, S. (2014). Reputation Formation and the
Evolution of Cooperation in Anonymous Online Markets. ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ZĞǀŝĞǁ,
ϳϵ(1),65–85.doi:10.1177/0003122413512316
Dijkstra,J.,&Bakker,D.M.(2017).Relativepower:Materialandcontextualelementsofefficacy
in social dilemmas. ^ŽĐŝĂů ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ, ϲϮ, 255–271. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.
2016.08.011
Dijkstra, J., & OudeMulders, J. (2014). Efficacy, Beliefs, and Investment in StepͲLevel Public















Fehr,E.,Fischbacher,U.,&Gächter,S. (2002).Strong reciprocity,humancooperation,and the
enforcementofsocialnorms.,ƵŵĂŶEĂƚƵƌĞ,ϭϯ(1),1–25.
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments.
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐZĞǀŝĞǁ,ϵϬ(4),980–994.doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980
Fehr,E.,&Gächter,S.(2002).Altruisticpunishmentinhumans.EĂƚƵƌĞ,ϰϭϱ(6868),137–140.
Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. (2007). Human motivation and social cooperation: Experimental and
analyticalfoundations.ŶŶƵĂůZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ,ϯϯ,43–64.
Fehr,E.,&Leibbrandt,A.(2011).AfieldstudyoncooperativenessandimpatienceintheTragedy
of the Commons. :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ WƵďůŝĐ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ, ϵϱ(9–10), 1144–1155. doi:10.1016/
j.jpubeco.2011.05.013
Fehrler,S.,&Przepiorka,W.(2016).Choosingapartnerforsocialexchange:Charitablegivingasa
signal of trustworthiness. :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ĂŶĚ KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ, ϭϮϵ, 157–171.
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.006
Fischbacher, U. (2007). zͲTree: Zurich toolbox for readyͲmade economic experiments.
ǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ,ϭϬ(2),171–178.





Flache, A. (2002). The rationalweakness of strong ties: Failure of group solidarity in a highly
cohesivegroupofrationalagents.:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨDĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂů^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ,Ϯϲ(3),189–216.
Flache, A., & Bakker, D. M. (2012). De zwakke kant van sociale controle. Theoretisch en




Flache,A.,Bakker,D.,Mäs,M.,&Dijkstra, J. (2017).TheDoubleEdgeofCounterͲSanctions. Is

























Friedman, J.W. (1971). A NonͲCooperative Equilibrium for Supergames. ZĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ,381–412.
Fung, J.M.Y.,Au,W.T.,Hu,W.,&Shi,K. (2012).Effectofriskorientationoncooperationand
decisionprocess inpublicgoodsdilemma.'ƌŽƵƉ WƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐΘ /ŶƚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉ ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ,ϭϱ(6),
791–803.doi:10.1177/1368430212448443
Gaertner, S. L.,Mann, J.,Murrell, A., & Dovidio, J. F. (1989). Reducing intergroup bias: The
benefitsof recategorization. :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ WĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ^ŽĐŝĂů WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ,ϱϳ(2),239–249.
doi:10.1037/0022Ͳ3514.57.2.239










Guala,F. (2012).Reciprocity:Weakor strong?Whatpunishmentexperimentsdo (anddonot)
demonstrate.ĞŚĂǀŝŽƌĂůĂŶĚƌĂŝŶ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ,ϯϱ(01),1–15.
Gunnthorsdottir,A.,Houser,D.,&McCabe,K. (2007).Disposition,history and contributions in








AnEmpiricalAnalysisof the ImpactofTeamsonProductivityandParticipation. :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ
WŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶŽŵǇ,ϭϭϭ(3),465–497.doi:10.1086/374182
Hardin,G.(1968).TheTragedyoftheCommons.^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ,ϭϲϮ(3859),1243–1248.












Hedstrom, P. (2005). ŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ^ŽĐŝĂů. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511488801
Henrich,J.,Boyd,R.,Bowles,S.,Camerer,C.,Fehr,E.,Gintis,H.,&McElreath,R.(2001).InSearch
of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 SmallͲScale Societies. ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐZĞǀŝĞǁ,ϵϭ(2),73–78.doi:10.1257/aer.91.2.73
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C.,&Gächter, S. (2008).Antisocial punishment across societies. ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ,
ϯϭϵ(5868),1362–1367.
Homans, G. C. (1974). ^ŽĐŝĂů ĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ͘ /ƚƐ ůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ &ŽƌŵƐ. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
House,R. J.,&Rizzo, J.R. (1972).Roleconflictandambiguityascriticalvariables inamodelof
organizationalbehavior.KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ĂŶĚ,ƵŵĂŶ WĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ,ϳ(3),467–505.
doi:10.1016/0030Ͳ5073(72)90030ͲX
Irwin,K.,&Horne,C. (2013).Anormativeexplanationofantisocialpunishment. ^ŽĐŝĂů ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ
ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ,ϰϮ(2),562–570.doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.10.004
Kanagaretnam,K.,Mestelman, S.,Nainar,K.,& Shehata,M. (2009).The impactof social value
orientationandriskattitudesontrustandreciprocity.:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐWƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ,ϯϬ(3),
368–380.doi:10.1016/j.joep.2008.12.003
Kerr,N. L. (1989). Illusionsofefficacy:Theeffectsofgroup sizeonperceivedefficacy in social
dilemmas. :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ ǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů ^ŽĐŝĂů WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ, Ϯϱ(4), 287–313. doi:10.1016/0022Ͳ
1031(89)90024Ͳ3










Kramer,R.M.,&Brewer,M.B. (1984).Effectsofgroup identityonresourceuse inasimulated





















Dynamics of Organizational Groups. dŚĞ ĐĂĚĞŵǇ ŽĨ DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ZĞǀŝĞǁ, Ϯϯ(2), 325.
doi:10.2307/259377
Lau,D.C.,&Murnighan, J.K. (2005). InteractionsWithinGroupsandSubgroups:TheEffectsof





Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The effect of social motives, communication and group size on
behaviour in an NͲperson multiͲstage mixedͲmotive game. ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ ^ŽĐŝĂů
WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ,ϭϰ,239–264.
Liebrand,W.B.G.,&McClintock,C.G.(1988).Theringmeasureofsocialvalues:acomputerized
procedure for assessing individual differences in information processing and social value
orientation.ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ,Ϯ(3),217–230.doi:10.1002/per.2410020304
Marwell,G.,& Ames, R. E. (1981). Economists free ride, does anyone else? :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ WƵďůŝĐ
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ,ϭϱ(3),295–310.








of norm violation in networks. ^ŽĐŝĂů EĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ, ϰϳ, 116–129. doi:10.1016/
j.socnet.2016.05.004
































selfͲenforcement. :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ WƵďůŝĐ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ, ϵϲ(9–10), 797–807. doi:10.1016/
j.jpubeco.2012.05.014
North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ WĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ, ϱ(1), 97–112. doi:10.1257/
jep.5.1.97
Noussair, C. N., van Soest, D.,& Stoop, J. (2015). Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a
framedfieldexperiment.^ŽĐŝĂůŚŽŝĐĞĂŶĚtĞůĨĂƌĞ,ϰϱ(3).doi:10.1007/s00355Ͳ014Ͳ0841Ͳ8
O’Leary, M. B., Mortensen, M., & Woolley, A. W. (2011). Multiple Team Membership: A
TheoreticalModel of its Effects on Productivity and Learning for Individuals and Teams.
ĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚZĞǀŝĞǁ,ϯϲ(3),461–478.doi:10.5465/AMR.2011.61031807
O’Leary,M.B.,Woolley,A.W.,&Mortensen,M. (2011).MultiteamMembership inRelation to
Multiteam Systems. In S. J. Zaccaro, M. A. Marks, & L. A. DeChurch (Eds.), DƵůƚŝƚĞĂŵ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͗ŶŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĨŽƌĚǇŶĂŵŝĐĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞǆĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ (pp.141–172).New
York:Routledge.






















Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Fields, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., & Policansky, D. (1999). Revisiting the
Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges. ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ, Ϯϴϰ(5412), 278–282. doi:10.1126/
science.284.5412.278
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a sword: SelfͲ
governance is possible. ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ WŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ZĞǀŝĞǁ, ϴϲ(2), 404–417. doi:10.2307/
1964229
Page, T.,Putterman, L.,&Unel,B. (2005).VoluntaryAssociation inPublicGoods Experiments:
Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency. dŚĞ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ :ŽƵƌŶĂů, ϭϭϱ(506), 1032–1053.
doi:10.1111/j.1468Ͳ0297.2005.01031.x

















in Sociology. dŚĞ :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ DĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂů ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ, ϯϱ(1–3), 1–25. doi:10.1080/
0022250X.2010.532263
Raub,W.,&Weesie, J. (1990).Reputation and efficiency in social interactions:An exampleof
networkeffects.ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ,626–654.
Rauhut, H., & Winter, F. (2017). Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of
Punishment. In B. Jann & W. Przepiorka (Eds.), ^ŽĐŝĂů ĚŝůĞŵŵĂƐ͕ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ (pp. 239–257). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/
9783110472974Ͳ012
Reuben, E.,&Riedl,A. (2013). Enforcementof contributionnorms inpublic good gameswith









Prosocial Behavior. ŶŶƵĂů ZĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ, ϰϭ, 43–63. doi:10.1146/annurevͲsocͲ
073014Ͳ112242
Simpson, B.,Willer, R.,& Harrell, A. (2017). The Enforcement ofMoral Boundaries Promotes













Tajfel,H.,&Turner, J. (1979).An integrative theoryof intergroupcontact. InW.G.Austin&S.





poolpunishment tomaintain thecommons.WƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐŽĨ ƚŚĞZŽǇĂů ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ͗ŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ,Ϯϳϵ(1743),3716–3721.doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.0937
vandeBrake,H. J.,Walter,F.,Rink,F.A.,Essens,P. J.M.D.,&vanderVegt,G.S. (2018).The
dynamicrelationshipbetweenmultipleteammembershipandindividualjobperformancein




ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ (pp. 77–92). New York, New York, USA:
SpringerScience+BusinessMedia.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Balliet, D. P., Parks, C. D., & Van Vugt, M. (2014). ^ŽĐŝĂů ĚŝůĞŵŵĂƐ͗
hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
VanLange,P.A.M.,Bekkers,R.,Schuyt,T.N.M.,&VanVugt,M.(2007).FromGamestoGiving:
Social Value Orientation Predicts Donations to Noble Causes. ĂƐŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƉƉůŝĞĚ ^ŽĐŝĂů
WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ,Ϯϵ(4),375–384.doi:10.1080/01973530701665223
















Van Lange, P.A.M.,Otten,W.,De Bruin, E.M.N.,& Joireman, J. a. (1997).Development of
prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence.
:ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ WĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ^ŽĐŝĂů WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ, ϳϯ(4), 733–746. doi:10.1037//0022Ͳ
3514.73.4.733
VanLange,P.A.M.,Rockenbach,B.,&Yamagishi,T. (Eds.). (2014).ZĞǁĂƌĚĂŶĚWƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ
^ŽĐŝĂůŝůĞŵŵĂƐ.OxfordUniversityPress.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.001.0001
Van Lange, P. A. M., Schippers, M., & Balliet, D. (2011). Who volunteers in psychology
experiments?Anempirical reviewofprosocialmotivation involunteering.WĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ,ϱϭ(3),279–284.doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.05.038
VanMiltenburg,N.,Buskens,V.,Barrera,D.,&Raub,W. (2014). Implementingpunishmentand
reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules.
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶƐ,ϴ(1),47–78.
VanMiltenburg, N., Przepiorka,W., & Buskens, V. (2017). Consensual punishment does not
promote cooperation in the sixͲperson prisoner’s dilemma game with noisy public
monitoring.W>K^KE,ϭϮ(11),e0188503.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0188503
VanSell,M.,Brief,A.P.,&Schuler,R.S.(1981).RoleConflictandRoleAmbiguity:Integrationof
the Literature and Directions for Future Research. ,ƵŵĂŶ ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ, ϯϰ(1), 43–71.
doi:10.1177/001872678103400104
Van Vugt,M., Van Lange, P. A.M., &Meertens, R.M. (1996). Commuting by car or public
transportation?Asocialdilemmaanalysisof travelmode judgements.ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ




Wiessner,P. (2005).Normenforcementamong the Ju/’hoansiBushmen.,ƵŵĂŶEĂƚƵƌĞ,ϭϲ(2),
115–145.doi:10.1007/s12110Ͳ005Ͳ1000Ͳ9
Willer,R. (2009).Groups reward individualsacrifice:Thestatussolution to thecollectiveaction
problem.ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ,ϳϰ(February),23–43.







Wittek,R.,&Bekkers,R. (2015).AltruismandProsocialBehavior,Sociologyof. In /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŶĐǇĐůŽƉĞĚŝĂ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ŽĐŝĂů Θ ĞŚĂǀŝŽƌĂů ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ (Vol. 1, pp. 579–583). Elsevier.
doi:10.1016/B978Ͳ0Ͳ08Ͳ097086Ͳ8.32158Ͳ4
Yamagishi,T.(1986).Theprovisionofasanctioningsystemasapublicgood.:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ
ĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂůWƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ,ϱϭ(1),110–116.doi:10.1037/0022Ͳ3514.51.1.110


164
 
